The owners of Microsoft’s videogame console, Xbox 360, filed a putative class action alleging a design defect. The district court struck class allegations from the complaint. The Ninth Circuit denied permission to appeal that order under FRCP 23(f), which authorizes permissive interlocutory appeal of class certification orders. Instead of pursuing their individual claims, plaintiffs stipulated to a voluntary dismissal, then appealed, challenging only the interlocutory order striking their class allegations. The Ninth Circuit held it had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1291, applicable to “final decisions of the district courts,” and that the rationale for striking the class allegations was impermissible. The Supreme Court reversed. Federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction under section 1291 to review an order denying class certification (or an order striking class allegations) after the named plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice. Section 1291’s final-judgment rule preserves the proper balance between trial and appellate courts, minimizes the harassment and delay that would result from repeated interlocutory appeals, and promotes the efficient administration of justice. Under plaintiffs’ theory, plaintiffs alone could determine whether and when to appeal an adverse certification ruling, allowing indiscriminate appellate review of interlocutory orders. Plaintiffs in putative class actions cannot transform interlocutory orders into section 1291 final judgments simply by dismissing their claims with prejudice. Finality “is not a technical concept of temporal or physical termination.” View "Microsoft Corp. v. Baker" on Justia Law

In consolidated class actions, plaintiffs claimed the brokers who represented them in the sale of their homes and a group of companies that provided services in connection with those sales violated their fiduciary duties by failing to disclose alleged kickbacks paid by the service providers to the brokers in connection with the sales. Defendants filed motions to compel arbitration on the basis of three separate agreements, at least one of which was executed by each plaintiff. The trial court found the arbitration clauses in two of the agreements inapplicable, but compelled the signatories of the third agreement to arbitrate with their brokers. Invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the court also required the signatories of the third agreement to arbitrate their claims against the service providers, who were not parties to the arbitration agreements. The court of appeals reversed with respect to the two arbitration clauses the lower court found inapplicable. Each of the plaintiffs executed one or the other of these two agreements. The court dismissed the cross-appeal of the plaintiffs who were required to arbitrate because an order compelling arbitration is not appealable. View "Laymon v. J. Rockcliff, Inc." on Justia Law

The National Labor Relations Board sought enforcement of its Order finding that AEI violated the National Labor Relations Act by barring employees from pursuing class-action litigation or collective arbitration of work-related claims and by forbidding an AEI technician from discussing a proposed compensation change with his coworkers and by firing that technician for discussing the proposed change and complaining to management about it. AEI employees sign an agreement that “Disputes … relating to your employment” must, at the election of the employee or the company, be resolved “exclusively through binding arbitration” and that “you and AEI also agree that a claim may not be arbitrated as a class action, also called ‘representative’ or ‘collective’ actions, and that a claim may not otherwise be consolidated or joined with the claims of others.” AEI’s employee handbook prohibits “[u]nauthorized disclosure of business secrets or confidential business or customer information, including any compensation or employee salary information.” The Sixth Circuit enforced the order. An arbitration provision requiring employees covered by the Act individually to arbitrate all employment-related claims is not enforceable. The evidence was adequate to support the ALJ’s factual findings and conclusion that DeCommer was fired for engaging in protected, concerted activity View "National Labor Relations Board v. Alternative Entertainment, Inc." on Justia Law

AMR provides ambulance services in more than 15 California counties, employing dispatchers, call takers, drivers, emergency medical technicians (EMT’s), paramedics and nurses. Plaintiffs, four current or former employees, claimed that AMR failed to provide the meal and rest periods to which they were entitled under Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512 and the applicable wage orders issued by the California Industrial Welfare Commission. They alleged a class claim under the Labor Code; a class claim under Business and Professions Code section 17200, the Unfair Competition Law; and a claim for civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), a representative action not subject to class action requirements. The court of appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of class certification as based on an incorrect legal assumption about the nature of rest periods: that a rest period during which an employee remains on call may be considered an off-duty rest period. The court acknowledged that there may be other bases on which the trial court may conclude on remand that plaintiffs have not shown the predominance of common issues required for class certification of their overarching rest period claim. View "Bartoni v. American Medical Response West" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a would-be class-action against China Agritech and others, alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Resh Action). Plaintiffs in this case were unnamed plaintiffs in two earlier would-be class actions against many of the same defendants based on the same underlying events (Dean and Smyth Actions). Class action certification was denied in both cases. Determining that appellate jurisdiction was proper, the Ninth Circuit held that the would-be class action brought by the Resh plaintiffs was not time-barred. In this case, plaintiffs' individual claims were tolled under American Pipe & Construction Co v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), and Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983), during the pendency of the Dean and Smyth Actions. The panel explained that so long as they can satisfy the criteria of FRCP 23, and can persuade the district court that comity or preclusion principles do not bar their action, they were entitled to bring their timely individual claims as named plaintiffs in a would-be class action. The panel held that permitting future class action named plaintiffs, who were unnamed class members in previously uncertified classes, to avail themselves of American Pipe tolling would advance the policy objectives that led the Supreme Court to permit tolling in the first place View "Resh v. China Agritech" on Justia Law

Landlord brought this interlocutory appeal challenging a summary judgment in favor of Tenant and the district court’s order certifying a class of tenants. Tenant filed an action seeking a declaration that certain lease provisions violated the Iowa Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) some, but not all, of the challenged lease provisions were prohibited under the Act; and (2) the certification of a class in this case was procedurally flawed. The court remanded the cause for the district court to make the findings required under Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.263(1). View "Walton v. Gaffey" on Justia Law

After their leases expired, three tenants, on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated residential tenants, brought suit against their landlord. The district court granted summary judgment for the tenants, declaring that certain of the landlord's lease provisions violated the Iowa Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. The court also certified a class of tenants. The landlord brought this interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) some, but not all, of the challenged lease provisions were prohibited under the Act; and (2) the class certification was procedurally flawed in the absence of findings required under Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.263(1). The court remanded the cause for further proceedings. View "Kline v. Southgate Property Management, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue was whether plaintiffs may amend their complaint, after a case has been removed to federal court, to change the definition of the class so as to eliminate minimal diversity and thereby divest the federal court of jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs may not do so and clarified that the range of amendments permitted under the panel's prior opinion in Benko v. Quality Loan Service Corp., 789 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2015), upon which the district court relied, is very narrow. Plaintiff filed suit against Visa and others, claiming that Visa is violating the state antitrust laws by fixing rates and preventing merchants from applying a surcharge for the use of credit cards. Because the existence of minimal diversity in this case must be determined on the basis of the pleadings at the time of removal in accordance with the general rule, the order of the district court remanding the case on the basis of a postremoval amendment must be reversed. View "Broadway Grill v. Visa" on Justia Law

In 2011, the district court approved a Settlement Agreement that created a $680 million compensation fund for the benefit of class members consisting of Native American farmers and ranchers who participated in a non-judicial, administrative claims process.In this appeal, two class members challenged the district court's approval of an addendum to the Agreement. The DC Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, rejecting the claim that the modification clause requires Appellant Mandan's assent before the Agreement can be amended. The DC Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the addendum was fair, reasonable, and adequate; the court declined to reach the merits of Mandan's legal challenges to the cy-près provision because these claims were explicitly waived before the district court; the claims were also forfeited because Mandan never raised any legal challenges to the cy-près provision before the district court despite clear opportunities to do so; and there were no good reasons at this point in the litigation to entertain Mandan's legal challenges to the cy-près provisions in the first instance. Finally, the DC Circuit found no merit in Appellant Tingle's breach of fiduciary duty claims. View "Keepseagle v. Perdue" on Justia Law

The district court did not abuse its discretion by certifying this case as a class action.Plaintiffs alleged that air pollution from a corn wet milling plant interfered with the use of their property. Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging nuisance, trespass, and negligence under common law and statute. The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and divided the class into two subclasses, one for members in close proximity to the plant and the other for those in peripheral proximity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class and that Defendant failed to show that the class certification order violated its due process rights. View "Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp." on Justia Law