Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that the fees Defendant charged for providing copies of their medical records and billing statements were excessive in violation of Iowa Code 622.10(6). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, alleging that section 622.10(6) did not apply to it because it was not a provider under the statute. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an entity that acts as a provider’s agent in fulfilling records requests covered by section 622.10(6) cannot charge more for producing the requested records than the provider itself could legally charge; and (2) the well-pleaded facts in the petition indicated that Defendant acted as an agent of the providers by fulfilling the records requests on their behalf, and therefore, the district court was correct in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ petition. View "Young v. Healthport Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and proposed class representatives Jeffrey Schermer, David Moravee, Tom Fisher, Janice Wenhold, Karen Vielma, Gloria Carruthers and George Rivera (collectively plaintiffs) appealed an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend to the class allegations in four of their causes of action in their second amended complaint (SAC). Plaintiffs' SAC involved 18 mobilehome parks allegedly owned and/or operated by defendants Thomas Tatum (Tatum) and Jeffrey Kaplan (Kaplan), which plaintiffs alleged were managed through defendant Mobile Community Management Company (MCM). Plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of residents who live in the 18 mobilehome parks, alleging they were subjected to uniform unconscionable lease agreements and leasing practices by defendants. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the trial court prematurely dismissed their class allegations because their operative complaint adequately pleaded "a community of interest with typical class representatives and predominately common questions of law and fact" with respect to their four causes of action; and that in so doing, the court improperly assessed its action "on the merits and failed to properly credit [p]laintiffs' unambiguous allegations, which were supported by the actual form lease agreements attached to the [SAC]." After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court, concluding the trial court properly sustained without leave to amend the demurrer to the class allegations in each of the four causes of action at issue, when it found there was no reasonable possibility plaintiffs could satisfy the community of interest requirement for class certification. View "Schermer v. Tatum" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and proposed class representatives Jeffrey Schermer, David Moravee, Tom Fisher, Janice Wenhold, Karen Vielma, Gloria Carruthers and George Rivera (collectively plaintiffs) appealed an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend to the class allegations in four of their causes of action in their second amended complaint (SAC). Plaintiffs' SAC involved 18 mobilehome parks allegedly owned and/or operated by defendants Thomas Tatum (Tatum) and Jeffrey Kaplan (Kaplan), which plaintiffs alleged were managed through defendant Mobile Community Management Company (MCM). Plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of residents who live in the 18 mobilehome parks, alleging they were subjected to uniform unconscionable lease agreements and leasing practices by defendants. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the trial court prematurely dismissed their class allegations because their operative complaint adequately pleaded "a community of interest with typical class representatives and predominately common questions of law and fact" with respect to their four causes of action; and that in so doing, the court improperly assessed its action "on the merits and failed to properly credit [p]laintiffs' unambiguous allegations, which were supported by the actual form lease agreements attached to the [SAC]." After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court, concluding the trial court properly sustained without leave to amend the demurrer to the class allegations in each of the four causes of action at issue, when it found there was no reasonable possibility plaintiffs could satisfy the community of interest requirement for class certification. View "Schermer v. Tatum" on Justia Law

Maurice Soffer died from lung cancer caused by smoking. Soffer’s widow, Lucille Soffer, brought a wrongful death action against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company pursuant to Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., alleging four causes of action, all of which had been pled in the Engle class litigation. Prior to trial, Soffer moved to amend her complaint to add a demand for punitive damages. The trial court granted the motion to amend. A judgment was entered for Soffer in the amount of $2 million. Soffer appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it was prohibited from awarding punitive damages on the counts for negligence and strict liability based on the procedural posture of the original Engle class action. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that individual members of the Engle class action are bound by the procedural prosture of the Engle class representatives when they pursue their individual lawsuits and, thus, cannot seek punitive damages on negligence or strict liability counts. The Supreme Court quashed the Court of Appeal’s decision, holding that the individual members of the Engle class action are not prevented from seeking punitive damages on all claims properly raised in their subsequent individual actions. View "Soffer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co." on Justia Law

Appellants, property owners and holders of oil and gas leases, filed a class-action complaint against Appellee, the circuit court clerk, alleging that Appellee and two of her deputies falsely and fraudulently notarized oil and gas leases. On remand and following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, concluding that Appellants had failed to show any damages as a result of Appellee’s purportedly unlawful act in recording the leases. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the grant of summary judgment was not in error, as none of the evidence relied upon by Appellants created a factual question as to whether they sustained damages as a result of the actions alleged in the complaint. View "Lipsey v. Cox" on Justia Law

Class representatives filed suit alleging that RHI committed numerous violations of Civil Code section 1747.08, also known as the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act. The trial court found RHI was liable for as many as 1,213,745 violations of that statute and set a penalty recovery in the amount of $30 per violation, subject to RHI's right to dispute any specific claim. Francesca Muller, a class member and the person prosecuting the appeal, requested the court order notice of the attorney fee motion be sent to all class members. The trial court denied the request, granted the attorney fee motion, and entered judgment in the action. Muller appealed. Michael Hernandez, class representative, contests each of Muller's claims of error. The court concluded that, under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, the court must adhere to Eggert v. Pac. States S. & L. Co. and dismiss the appeal. Even if the court were free to disregard Eggert, adhering to Eggert's approach would not leave nonparty class members without protection or appellate recourse. Under California law, where class members are given the option of opting out, they are not bound by the judgment in the class action but instead may pursue their own action. Intervention would have the effect of giving Muller a clear avenue from which to challenge the attorney fee award. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc." on Justia Law

Farmworkers filed a class action lawsuit against four corporate defendants. Two questions of Washington law were certified to the Washington Supreme Court, arising from this suit: The first question implicated RCW 19.30.010(2)'s definition of a "farm labor contractor." The second question implicated RCW 19.30.200, which imposed joint and several liability for Farm Labor Contractor Act (FLCA) violations. The certified questions required the Supreme Court to decide whether defendant-appellant NW Management and Realty Services Inc. was a "farm labor contractor" under RCW 19.30.01 0(2) and, if so, whether the other defendants "knowingly use[ d]" its services under RCW 19.30.200 (There is no dispute that NW was unlicensed at all times relevant to this case). The plain language of the FLCA compels the Washington Court to answer yes to both certified questions. View "Saucedo v. John Hancock Life & Health Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class-action suit against their former employer, Huntington Bank, alleging that the Bank failed to pay overtime compensation as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201-219. Plaintiffs moved to conditionally certify a class of all current and former employees whose primary job duty consisted of “underwriting,” or “providing [Huntington’s] credit products to customers after reviewing and evaluating the loan applications against [the Bank’s] credit standards and guidelines that governed when to provide those credit products to those customers.” The court certified a smaller class of underwriters. The court found, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, that those who worked with residential-loan products are administrative employees and not entitled to overtime pay. Their job duties related to the general business operations of the Bank, and they exercised discretion and independent judgment when performing those duties. View "Lutz v. Huntington Bancshares, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) against their employer, FTS, a cable-television business for which the plaintiffs work or worked as cable technicians. The district court certified the case as an FLSA collective action, allowing 293 other technicians to opt in. FTS Technicians are paid pursuant to a piece-rate compensation plan; each assigned job is worth a set amount of pay, regardless of the amount of time it takes to complete the job. FTS Technicians are paid by applying a .5 multiplier to their regular rate for overtime hours. They allege that FTS implemented a company-wide time-shaving policy that required its employees to systematically underreport their overtime hours. Technicians either began working before their recorded start times, recorded lunch breaks they did not take, or continued working after their recorded end time. Technicians also presented documentary evidence and testimony showing that FTS’s time-shaving policy originated with FTS’s corporate office. A jury returned verdicts in favor of the class, which the district court upheld before calculating and awarding damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed certification of the case as a collective action and a finding that sufficient evidence supports the verdicts, but reversed the calculation of damages. View "Monroe v. FTS USA, LLC" on Justia Law

United Foods & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1473 filed a class action against Hormel Foods Corporation alleging that Hormel violated Wisconsin wage and hour laws by failing to pay employees for time spent putting on and taking off company-required clothing and equipment before and after shifts at one of Hormel’s canning plants. The circuit court ruled in favor of the Union, ordered Hormel to compensate its employees for time spent “donning” and “doffing” the required clothing and equipment, and awarded the class monetary damages of $195,087. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Hormel is required to compensate its employees for the 5.7 minutes per day spent donning and doffing the clothing and equipment at the beginning and end of the day; and (2) the required donning and doffing of clothing and equipment at the beginning and end of the day does not fall within the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex, as the wages involved are not a “trifle” either for the employees or Hormel. View "United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Hormel Foods Corp." on Justia Law