P.F. Chang’s restaurant company announced that its computer system had been breached and some consumer credit- and debit–card data had been stolen. Kosner had dined at a P.F. Chang’s and paid with his debit card. Four fraudulent transactions were made with the card he had used; he cancelled it and purchased, for $106, a credit monitoring service to protect against identity theft, including against use of the card’s data to open new accounts in his name. Lewert used a debit card at the same restaurant (thought to be not among those breached) and had no fraudulent transactions, but claims that he spent time and effort monitoring his card statements and his credit report. Lewert and Kosner sought to represent a class of all similarly situated customers, under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2). The district court dismissed for lack of standing, finding they had not suffered the requisite personal injury. The Seventh Circuit reversed. At least some of the injuries alleged qualify as immediate and concrete injuries sufficient to support Article III standing; all class members should be allowed to show that they spent time and resources tracking down possible fraud, changing automatic charges, and replacing cards as a prophylactic measure. View "Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc" on Justia Law

Florencio Pacleb filed a class action complaint against Allstate, alleging that he received unsolicited automated calls to his cell phone in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227. Allstate deposited $20,000 in full settlement of Pacleb’s individual monetary claims in an escrow account “pending entry of a final District Court order or judgment directing the escrow agent to pay the tendered funds to Pacleb, requiring Allstate to stop sending non-emergency telephone calls and short message service messages to Pacleb in the future and dismissing this action as moot.” The court affirmed the district court's order denying Allstate’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that, even if the district court entered judgment affording Pacleb complete relief on his individual claims for damages and injunctive relief, mooting those claims, Pacleb would still be able to seek class certification under Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., which remains good law under Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co. The court also concluded that, even if Pitts were not binding, and Allstate could moot the entire action by mooting Pacleb’s individual claims for damages and injunctive relief, those individual claims are not now moot, and the court will not direct the district court to moot them by entering judgment on them before Pacleb has had a fair opportunity to move for class certification. View "Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Best Buy and three of its executives, alleging violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants made fraudulent or recklessly misleading public statements in a press release and conference call, which artificially inflated and maintained Best Buy's publicly traded stock price until the misstatements were disclosed. In this interlocutory appeal, defendants challenged the district court's certification of the class. In Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), the Supreme Court concluded that loss causation has no logical connection to the facts necessary to establish the efficient market predicate to Basic, Inc. v. Levinson's fraud-on-the-market theory. The court agreed with the district court that, when plaintiffs presented a prima facie case that the Basic presumption applies to their claims, defendants had the burden to come forward with evidence showing a lack of price impact. However, what the district court ignored is that defendants did present strong evidence on this issue. Defendants rebutted the Basic presumption by submitting direct evidence (the opinions of both parties’ experts) that severed any link between the alleged conference call misrepresentations and the stock price at which plaintiffs purchased. Because plaintiffs presented no contrary evidence of price impact, they failed to satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in certifying the class, and the court reversed and remanded. View "IBEW Local 98 Pension Fund v. Best Buy Co., Inc." on Justia Law

American Heritage Apartments, Inc., a customer of the Hamilton County Water and Wastewater Treatment Authority (County Authority), filed suit both individually and as a class representative asserting that the County Authority exceeded its statutory authority by imposing a monthly charge on its customers. The County Authority sought dismissal of the lawsuit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, arguing that a customer who seeks to dispute the rates charged must first follow the administrative procedures provided in the Utility District Law of 1937 (UDL). The trial court agreed and dismissed the lawsuit. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the administrative procedures in Part 4 of the UDL do not apply to a rate challenge filed by an individual customer against a water and wastewater treatment authority, and therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the lawsuit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (2) the trial court’s alternative ruling on class certification is vacated, and that issue is remanded to the trial court for reconsideration. View "Am. Heritage Apartments, Inc. v. Hamilton County Water & Wastewater Treatment Auth." on Justia Law

Duwayne Mason appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Seacor, as well as the denial of Mason's motion to be recognized as a plaintiff who opted out of the class action settlement at issue in this case. Seacor owned and operated a vessel that assisted in putting out the fire after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill explosion in the Gulf of Mexico and that subsequently took part in the cleanup efforts. In response to a class action filed against it relating to damages stemming from the Deepwater Horizon incident, Seacor filed a limitation of liability action under 46 U.S.C. 30505. Mason, an employee of Seacor and a member of the crew aboard the vessel, alleged injuries sustained from his firefighting efforts. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to determine that Mason had opted out of the class action settlement through informal means. Even assuming arguendo that a reasonable indication of a desire to opt out would suffice, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Mason’s conduct did not reasonably indicate a desire to opt out of the Medical Benefits Settlement Class. Further, the court rejected Mason's argument that the notice of the Agreement was constitutionally deficient in both delivery and content where Mason had actual notice through his counsel, which satisfies due process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In Re: Deepwater Horizon" on Justia Law

Graiser, an Ohio citizen, saw a “Buy One, Get One Free” eyeglasses advertisement at the Beachwood, location of Visionworks, a Texas eye-care corporation operating in more than 30 states. According to Graiser, a Visionworks salesperson quoted Graiser “a price of $409.93 for eyeglasses, with a second eyeglasses ‘free.’” Alternatively, the salesperson told Graiser that he could purchase a single pair of eyeglasses for $245.95. Graiser filed a purported class action in state court, alleging violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. Visionworks removed the case under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), claiming that the amount in controversy recently surpassed CAFA’s jurisdictional threshold of $5,000,000. Graiser successfully moved to remand, arguing that removal was untimely under the 30-day period in 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(3). The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that section 1446(b)’s 30-day window for removal under CAFA is triggered when the defendant receives a document from the plaintiff from which it can first be ascertained that the case is removable under CAFA. The presence of CAFA jurisdiction provides defendants with a new window for removability, even if the case was originally removable under a different theory of federal jurisdiction. View "Graiser v. Visionworks of America, Inc." on Justia Law

Weitzner, a Brooklyn, New York doctor, filed a putative class action against Sanofi and Vaxserve, alleging that they transmitted more than 10,000 facsimiles to members of the class without the prior express invitation or permission, violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227. Before a motion for class certification was filed, defendants made offers of judgment under FRCP 682 to both Weitzner and his professional corporation: $1,500 for each facsimile advertisement sent to Plaintiff “understood to be eleven (11) facsimile transmissions.” Defendants also offered to pay costs and to stop sending any facsimile advertisements in violation of the TCPA. Plaintiffs did not respond to the offers. More than 14 days after defendants made their offers, defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, contending their unaccepted offers mooted the case. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to dismiss, stating that plaintiffs had not engaged in “undue delay” in failing to file their motion for class certification and a successful class certification motion would “‘relate . . . back to the filing of the class complaint.’” The Supreme Court’s 2016 decision, Campbell-Ewald Company v. Gomez, held that an unaccepted offer does not make such a case moot. View "Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc" on Justia Law

The "Olson I" opinion examined the extent to which the 1976 amendment to the then-existing Government Code section 68203 aimed at placing a limit on cost of living adjustments (COLA's) for the salaries payable to active jurists and (derivatively) also limiting the pensions payable to certain judicial pensioners, could constitutionally be applied to those active jurists and judicial pensioners. Since Olson I, numerous courts have addressed issues stemming from Olson I, including whether a constitutional amendment designed to supersede Olson I and deprive active jurists and certain judicial pensioners of the benefits provided by the uncapped COLA's was constitutional, and whether interest was due on the payments owed to active and retired judges under the judgment announced in Olson I. This case represented the latest progeny of Olson I. Petitioner Faye Staniforth (and others similarly situated) alleged, as its principal claim against respondent The Judges' Retirement System (JRS), that JRS had not adhered to its obligations to pensioners under their interpretation of Olson I and that, as a result, over three decades worth of pension payments had been underpaid to pensioners. The Olson I claims raised by pensioners sought to compel the JRS to adhere to pensioners' interpretation of Olson I and to recalculate the amount of judicial pensions owed to pensioners using the uncapped COLA's, and to pay arrearages and interest for the decades of underpaid pension payments. The Court of Appeal concluded, contrary to pensioners' Olson I claims, pensioners were not entitled under Olson I to perpetual uncapped COLA increases to their pensions. JRS demurred to an amended petition, arguing that all the stated claims, which sought recovery for payments to the retired jurists that allegedly should have been paid over two decades before the present action was filed, were barred by the statute of limitations under any possibly applicable statute. Petitioners appealed, but finding no error in the trial court's sustaining JRS' demurrer without leave to amend, and dismissal of the action, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Staniforth v. The Judges' Retirement System" on Justia Law

Appellants and appellees are two teams of named plaintiffs and their respective lawyers who disagree over the proper direction for a consumer class action settlement. In Radcliffe I, the court held that appellees created a conflict of interest by conditioning incentive awards for the class representatives on their approval of the proposed settlement agreement. On remand, appellants moved the district court to disqualify appellees’ counsel from representing the class based on that conflict. The court agreed with the district court that California does not apply a rule of automatic disqualification for conflicts of simultaneous representation in the class action context, and concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that appellees’ counsel will adequately represent the class. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the qualification motion. View "Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Solutions" on Justia Law

After EyeCare Specialties, P.C. of Lincoln terminated the employment of Cindy Marshall, Marshall sued, alleging that EyeCare discriminated against her because of her skin condition, tremors, and perceived disability related to her past prescription drug abuse. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of EyeCare. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning whether EyeCare discriminated against Marshall because of her skin condition and tremors, both of which EyeCare perceived to substantially limit Marshall’s ability to work; and (2) Marshall failed to present evidence that EyeCare discriminated against her for having a perceived drug addiction that substantially limited one or more major life activities. View "Marshall v. EyeCare Specialties, P.C." on Justia Law