Plaintiffs, a class of former employees of Continental, filed suit against Celadon, alleging that Celadon violated the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, 29 U.S.C. 2102. The district court certified the class, granted partial summary judgment to the employees, and awarded damages. Viewing the Celadon–Continental transaction in light of a common-sense approach, the court agreed with the district court that the transaction was more than merely a sale of assets. Consequently, responsibility to provide notice passed from Continental to Celadon under the WARN Act where plaintiffs became employees of Celadon. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Celadon to bear the burden of establishing that certain members of the certified class should be excluded; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Celadon's motion to decertify the class; and the district court did not err in not adopting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation regarding class membership. In regard to the issue of damages, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by shifting the burden to Celadon after the employees made their initial showing. After thoroughly reviewing the evidentiary rulings of the district court in light of the burden-shifting framework it employed, the court held that the district court did not commit a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reduce Celadon's liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Day v. Celadon Trucking Servs." on Justia Law

In an antitrust class action brought on behalf of approximately 12 million merchants against Visa and Mastercard, as well as other various banks, plaintiffs alleged conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. After the parties agreed to a settlement releasing all claims, the district court certified two settlement-only classes and approved the settlement. Numerous objectors and opt‐out plaintiffs appealed and argued that the class action was improperly certified and that the settlement was unreasonable and inadequate. The court concluded that class members of the (b)(2) class were inadequately represented in violation of both FRCP 23(a)(4) and the Due Process Clause. The court also concluded that procedural deficiencies produced substantive shortcomings in this class action and the settlement. Consequently, the court concluded that the class action was improperly certified and the settlement was unreasonable and inadequate. The court vacated the district court's certification of the class action and reversed the approval of the settlement. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust" on Justia Law

According to the complaint, Dustin Limberg sought emergency department care and treatment at Sanford Medical Center Fargo. He did not have insurance and was asked to sign, and did sign, Sanford's "Statement of Financial Responsibility and Release of Information" form ("the contract"). After receiving his bill for the visit, Limberg filed a class action lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that Sanford's billing practices were unfair, unconscionable, or unreasonable because the contract contained an "open price" term. He claimed the term "all charges" as referenced in the Sanford contract was ambiguous and he and the class were liable to Sanford only for the reasonable value of the treatment and services provided to them. Sanford moved for dismissal, which the district court granted. Limberg appealed. On appeal, he argued the district court should not have dismissed the case. Because the district court appropriately dismissed the case, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Limberg v. Sanford Medical Center Fargo" on Justia Law

In 2005, FedEx delivery drivers, represented by Defendants (lawyers), filed suit, alleging that FedEx had misclassified them as independent contractors, citing the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (IWPCA), 820 ILCS 115/1. In 2011, after the court granted partial summary judgment, holding that plaintiffs were IWPCA employees, Rocha joined the action. His agreement with Defendants limited the scope of representation because he was pursuing other claims against FedEx on behalf of his company with separate representation by Johnson (his spouse). The agreement affirmed Rocha’s right to accept or reject any settlement. In 2012, the parties notified the court of a tentative settlement. Defendants told Rocha and Johnson that FedEx required “a release of all claims against FedEx both individually and on behalf of any associated corporation,” but reasserted Rocha’s right to not join the settlement. After the court approved the settlement, it allowed Defendants to withdraw as Rocha's counsel, dismissed the case with prejudice for all named plaintiffs except Rocha, and dismissed Rocha's case without prejudice. Rocha was not required to pay attorney’s fees or expenses. The district court later dismissed Rocha’s separate suit. Before filing his state‐court complaint (still pending), Rocha sued Defendants, claiming breach of contract, malpractice, fraud, and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding no plausible grounds for relief. View "Rocha v. Rudd" on Justia Law

In December 2012, the Korean Ministry of Food and Drug Safety suspended the sales of Mario Badescu's Healing Cream after testing revealed the product contained two unlabeled corticosteroids, hydrocortisone and triamcinolone acetonide. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a nationwide class of face cream purchasers, filed suit seeking economic damages and equitable relief. Defendants agreed to settle the action before the class was certified. In this appeal, nine class members raise numerous challenges. In the published portion of the opinion, the court held that the one-time publication of the notice of settlement did not violate the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Civ. Code, 1750 et seq. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Choi v. Mario Badescu Skin Care, Inc." on Justia Law

A circuit court in Boone County, Kentucky entered a multimillion dollar judgment against Stanley Chesley, a former attorney, for his conduct in a class action lawsuit that eventually settled. Chesley filed suit in Ohio state court seeking an injunction to prevent Respondents from collecting on the judgment and to relitigate the case. The Hamilton County Common Pleas Court Judge Robert Ruehlman acted outside its jurisdiction to repeatedly shield Chesley and his assets from creditors. Relator Angela Ford filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to preclude Judge Ruehlman from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over the Hamilton County case. The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ of prohibition and ordered the judge to vacate his orders, holding that Judge Ruehlman had no statutory authority to grant relief in this case. View "State ex rel. Ford v. Ruehlman" on Justia Law

Wagener agreed to review proposed ads from MR, then received a fax from MR, including pricing and sample fax advertisements, and stating that MR would not send out ads unless Wagener returned an approved copy. During a follow-up call, Wagener stated that he did not like the samples. The caller agreed to provide a new sample and a list of potential recipients. Wagener wanted to verify that potential recipients were businesses that would be interested in his services and were located in the relevant geographical region. Wagener did not receive that list or a final ad and was surprised to find that a fax advertisement had been transmitted to thousands of recipients without his approval. Wagener immediately tried to contact MR but received no response. Wagener then learned that his employee had mistakenly mailed a check to MR. Wagener’s bank implemented a stop order. Wagener never heard from MR again. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(C), subjects the sender of unauthorized faxes to a statutory penalty of $500 per violation. The ads at issue violated the Act. The district court certified a class of more than 10,000 plaintiffs. A jury found that Wagener had not “authorize[d] the fax broadcast transmission,” and did not “have direct, personal participation in the authorization of the fax broadcast transmission.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings and jury instructions. View "Paldo Sign & Display Co. v. Wagener Equities, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action petition against J.C. Penney asserting that the internet retailer unlawfully charged Iowa sales tax on shipping and handling charges. J.C. Penney forwarded the tax to the Iowa Department of Revenue (IDOR) pursuant to the Iowa version of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Act (SSUTA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of J.C. Penney. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly granted J.C. Penney’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s statutory claims grounded in SSUTA, as the SSUTA does not create a private cause of action; (2) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims related to the alleged unlawful payment of taxes on the ground that the remedies under Iowa Code 423.45(3) and 423.47 are exclusive remedies barring other claims for relief for wrongful payment of taxes under SSUTA; and (3) Plaintiff was not entitled to recover on her claims alleging shipping and handling misrepresentations. View "Bass v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit on his own behalf and also moved to represent 605 former and current sales associates as a class, alleging that Stoneledge requires sales associates to perform many tasks unrelated to sales. Plaintiff claimed that Stoneledge does not pay its sales associates for such work, beyond what they earn in commissions, and this policy violates California wage and hour laws. The district court granted class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The court concluded that the district court permissibly concluded that plaintiff had pleaded a common injury capable of class-wide resolution; where the need for individual damages calculations does not, alone, defeat class certification, the district court permissibly ruled that individual claims did not predominate in this case; and the district court did not violate the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. 2072(b), or abuse its discretion in certifying the class. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bermudez Vaquero v. Ashley Furniture" on Justia Law

Blue Cross controls more than 60% of the Michigan commercial health insurance market; its patients are more profitable for hospitals than are patients insured by Medicare or Medicaid. BC enjoys “extraordinary market power.” The Justice Department (DOJ) claimed that BC used that power to require MFN agreements: BC would raise its reimbursement rates for services, if a hospital agreed to charge other commercial insurers rates at least as high as charged to BC. BC obtained MFN agreements with 40 hospitals and MFN-plus agreements with 22 hospital systems. Under MFN-plus, the greater the spread between BC's rates and the minimum rates for other insurers, the higher the rates that BC would pay. Class actions, (consolidated) followed the government’s complaint, alleging damages of more than $13.7 billion, and seeking treble damages under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C 15. In 2013, Michigan banned MFN clauses; DOJ dismissed its suit. During discovery in the private actions, plaintiffs hired an antitrust expert, Leitzinger. BC moved to exclude Leitzinger’s report and testimony. Materials relating to that motion and to class certification were filed under seal, although the report does not discuss patient information. BC agreed to pay $30 million, about one-quarter of Leitzinger's estimate, into a settlement fund and not to oppose requests for fees, costs, and named-plaintiff “incentive awards,” within specified limits. After these deductions, $14,661,560 would be allocated among three-to-seven-million class members. Class members who sought to examine the court record or the bases for the settlement found that most key documents were heavily redacted or sealed. The court approved the settlement and denied the objecting class members’ motion to intervene. The Seventh Circuit vacated, stating that the court compounded its error in sealing the documents when it approved the settlement without meaningful scrutiny of its fairness to unnamed class members . View "Shane Group, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich." on Justia Law