The City of Chicago obtained a default administrative judgment of $3,540 against Plaintiff (Manistee Apartments), based upon a finding of code violations. The city registered the judgment and imposed a lien against plaintiff’s real estate. Plaintiff contends that it first received actual notice of the lien during routine title insurance review while it was preparing to sell its properties. In response to plaintiff’s effort to settle the matter, the city demanded $5,655.16, reflecting $720.34 in statutory interest plus $1,394.82 in collection costs and attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff conveyed its property, paid $5,655.16 under protest, and filed a federal class action, alleging due process violations. The court dismissed, stating that the plaintiff failed to allege facts that plausibly supported the assertion that it paid the demand under duress; because its payment was voluntary, plaintiff was not deprived of a constitutionally-protected property interest under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the claim was more appropriate for small claims court and questioning: why would such a small amount cause the plaintiff to exert so much time and effort? The court stated that it suspected that only lawyers stood to benefit. View "Manistee Apartments, LLC v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Abraham operated B2B, a fax advertising company. Abraham has testified that she believed it was legal to send fax advertising to companies that had an established business relationship with the sender and mistakenly thought the companies on her list met that standard. B2B faxed an advertisement for Top Flite—a Michigan mortgage company—to more than 4,000 fax numbers, using that list. Recipients alleged that the fax was unsolicited and that they did not have an established business relationship with Top Flite and filed suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227. The district court denied class certification, making “no determinations” as to the requirements in Rule 23(a), but focusing on Rule 23(b)(3)'s requirement of predominance. The court expressed concern that individual class members might have consented to receiving the challenged faxes, and that determining whether they had consented would require investigation of each person or business. Top Flite then offered to allow an injunction and judgment of $1,550. Under Rule 68(b), the offers lapsed. Top Flite successfully moved to dismiss, arguing that because the court had denied class certification and plaintiffs had failed to accept offers of judgment that encompassed all of the individual relief sought, the complaints were moot. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Speculation alone regarding individualized consent was insufficient to defeat plaintiffs’ showing of predominance under Rule 23(b)(3) and the unaccepted settlement offer was a nullity. View "Bridging Communities, Inc. v. Top Flite Financial, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2010, plaintiffs, former employees of establishments that operate in “Fourth Street Live,” a Louisville entertainment district, sued, alleging violations of the Kentucky Wage and Hour Act, KRS 337.385, based on policies regarding off-the-clock work and mandatory tip-pooling. In 2012, the district court granted class certification under Rules 23(a) and 23(b). In 2013, the defendants unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, citing the Supreme Court’s 2013 "Comcast" decision. In 2014, the parties reached a financial settlement. It took almost another year to reach an agreement regarding non-monetary terms. In March 2015, the parties filed a joint status report declaring that they had reached a settlement agreement and anticipated filing formal settlement documents in April. The defendants then became aware of a February 2015 Kentucky Court of Appeals holding that KRS 337.385 could not support class-action claims. Defendants unsuccessfully moved to stay approval of the settlement. The court granted preliminary approval of the settlement. The Sixth Circuit denied an appeal as untimely because the defendants had not challenged an appealable class-certification order under Rule 23(f). Defendants filed another unsuccessful decertification motion with the district court. The court granted final approval of the settlement as “a binding contract under Kentucky law.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A post-settlement change in the law does not alter the binding nature of the parties’ agreement. View "Whitlock v. FSL Management, LLC" on Justia Law

On February 10, 2015, Meyers was given a copy of his receipt after dining at Nicolet Restaurant in de Pere, Wisconsin. He noticed that Nicolet’s receipt did not truncate the expiration date, as required by the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA), 15 U.S.C. 1681. Meyers filed a putative class action, purportedly on behalf of everyone who had been provided a non‐compliant receipt at Nicolet, seeking only statutory damages. The district court denied Meyers’ motion for class certification, holding that Meyers had satisfied FRCP 23(a)’s four prerequisites, but failed to establish that class‐wide issues would “predominate” over issues affecting only individual potential class members. Fed R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)). In a separate suit, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that sovereign immunity barred Meyers’ claim against the Oneida Tribe, the owner of the restaurant. The Seventh Circuit then held that Meyers lacked standing in his suit against the restaurant. Violation of a statute, completely divorced from any potential real‐world harm, is not sufficient to satisfy Article III’s injury‐in‐fact requirement so, the district court lacked authority to certify a class action. View "Meyers v. Nicolet Restaurant of DePere, LLC" on Justia Law

CACH, LLC filed a complaint against William Echols alleging that Echols breached his contract with a bank when he defaulted on his obligation to pay for charges incurred on a credit card and that, as current owner of the account, CACH was entitled to payment of the balance due on the credit card. Echols filed a class action counterclaim alleging that CACH violated the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the common law when it demanded payment from and filed suit against Echols and other Arkansas residents. The circuit court entered an order granting class certification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting class certification. View "CACH, LLC v. Echols" on Justia Law

Edward Snow, individually and as putative class representative on behalf of all similarly situated people, filed a complaint against SEECO, Inc. alleging that SEECO had underpaid royalties to plaintiffs, a group of landowners who had entered into natural gas leases with SEECO. Snow subsequently filed a motion for class certification. The circuit court granted Snow’s motion to present a class of Arkansas citizens who entered into lease agreements with SEECO for the production of natural gas on their property in the Fayetteville Shale. SEECO appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class. View "SEECO Inc. v. Snow" on Justia Law

In this class action case, the circuit court granted class certification to a group of landowners who entered into natural gas leases with SEECO, Inc., DeSoto Gathering Company, and Southwestern Midstream Services Company (collectively, SEECO). After the court certified the class and the class certification was pending on appeal, the class representative died. The circuit court judge entered an order finding that Stephanie DeVazier was a qualified class representative and approved her as a substitute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prior filing of a competing class action lawsuit did not preclude this case from going forward; (2) the circuit court properly certified the class; and (3) DeVazier was properly substituted as lead plaintiff. View "SEECO Inc. v. Stewmon" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were both insured by USAA Casualty Insurance Company under auto insurance policies that provided medical payments coverage. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against USAA arguing that USAA’s practice of sending medical claims to Auto Injury Solutions (AIS) for review was an improper cost containment scheme designed to deprive Montana consumers of their first-party medical pay benefits. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion to certify a proposed class. The district court issued its order certifying the class, concluding “all members of the proposed class were subject to the same claims processing procedure of outsourcing claims to AIS. USAA appealed from the certification order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion by certifying the class under Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and under Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Remanded. View "Byorth v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Wright filed suit in federal court against Pilot, alleging that Pilot and certain Pilot employees systematically shortchanged some trucking companies with whom Pilot had discount agreements by failing to give them the agreed-upon benefits. Wright filed claims under both state and federal law. At issue here is whether federal courts that are given original subject-matter jurisdiction over state-law claims by the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), retain that jurisdiction even when the class claims are dismissed before the class is certified. The district court found that CAFA does not vest the federal courts with original jurisdiction over state-law claims after the class claims are dismissed. Pilot argues that CAFA conferred original jurisdiction over all of Wright’s claims at the time Wright filed them, such that the jurisdiction could not have divested when the class claims were later dismissed. Here, Wright first filed directly in federal court under CAFA but now wishes to refile in state court. When the post-filing action that did away with the class claims is not an amendment to the complaint, the court saw no basis for distinguishing cases originally filed in federal court under CAFA from those removed to federal court. Therefore, the court concluded that CAFA continues to confer original federal jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims in this suit. Because CAFA vested the district court with original jurisdiction over the remaining claims, there was no need for it to analyze supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Wright Transportation, Inc. v. Pilot Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of themselves and similarly situated persons, alleging that Wackenhut violated California labor laws by failing to provide employees with off-duty meal and rest breaks and by providing inadequate wage statements. The trial court initially granted plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Then the United States Supreme Court reversed a grant of certification in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. Wackenhut, relying on Wal-Mart, moved for decertification, which the trial court granted. Plaintiffs appealed, contending that decertification was not warranted by a change in circumstances or case law and that the trial court used improper criteria in granting the motion for decertification. The court concluded that the trial court’s reliance on Wal-Mart to support decertification for each of plaintiffs’ claims overextended holdings in that case. In this case, the crux of Wackenhut's motion for decertification and the trial court’s subsequent order was Wal-Mart’s treatment of statistical sampling. The trial court determined that this method was disapproved in Wal-Mart. After the trial court issued its decertification order, the Supreme Court clarified in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo that Wal-Mart does not prohibit the broad use of statistical sampling in class action lawsuits. Here, statistical evidence was proposed only for the limited purpose of determining how many employees had signed on-duty meal agreements lacking revocation language during the class period. The trial court also misapplied Wal-Mart by finding that individualized inquiries were necessary. The distinctive nature of Title VII liability also distinguishes Wal-Mart from the facts of this case. The court reversed the order and remanded as to off-duty meal break, rest brake, and wage statement issues, and for further proceedings. View "Lubin v. Wackenhut Corp." on Justia Law