Fleet Owners Fund is a multi-employer “welfare benefit plan” under the Employee Retirement Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, and a “group health plan” under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), 26 U.S.C. 5000A. Superior Dairy contracted with Fleet for employee medical insurance; the Participation Agreement incorporated by reference a 2002 Agreement. In a purported class action, Superior and its employee alleged that, before entering into the Agreement, it received assurances from Fleet Owners and plan trustees, that the plan would comply in all respects with federal law, including ERISA and the ACA. Plaintiffs claim that, notwithstanding the ACA’s statutory requirement that all group health plans eliminate per-participant and per-beneficiary pecuniary caps for both annual and lifetime benefits, the plan maintains such restrictions and that Superior purchased supplemental health insurance benefits to fully cover its employees. Fleet argued that the plan is exempt from such requirements as a “grandfathered” plan. The district court dismissed the seven-count complaint. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring claims under ERISA and ACA, having failed to allege concrete injury, and did not allege specific false statements. View "Soehnlen v. Fleet Owners Insurance Fund" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee Elizabeth Hammond sought to pursue a class action in New Mexico state court on behalf of everyone in the country who, like her, called to cancel their Stamps.com subscriptions after “discovering” that Stamps.com “was taking money from them” every month. Hammond alleged that this class included “hundreds or thousands of persons.” And while she didn't allege a total damages amount, she contended that she was entitled to $300 in statutory damages and that other members of the proposed class should “likely” receive damages of $31.98, representing two monthly subscription charges ($15.99 x 2), based on her estimate of how long customers could have reasonably failed to notice the monthly charges before calling to cancel. Hammond also sought punitive damages for herself and other class members. Stamps.com sought to remove the case to federal court, presenting uncontested declarations showing that in the last four years, at least 312,680 customers called to cancel their subscriptions. The company observed that, if each of these persons were to win the same $300 in damages Hammond sought for herself, the value of this case would exceed $93 million. And even if other class members could secure only $31.98 in damages, the company noted, the case’s potential value would still lie at almost $10 million. The district court found lack of jurisdiction, holding that Stamps.com failed to meet its burden of showing that over $5 million was "in controversy" because the company failed to disaggregate from the total number of customer cancellations those customers who “felt duped” by Stamps.com’s website disclosures. Disagreeing with the district court's decision it lacked jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hammond v. Stamps.com" on Justia Law

The City of Chicago obtained a default administrative judgment of $3,540 against Plaintiff (Manistee Apartments), based upon a finding of code violations. The city registered the judgment and imposed a lien against plaintiff’s real estate. Plaintiff contends that it first received actual notice of the lien during routine title insurance review while it was preparing to sell its properties. In response to plaintiff’s effort to settle the matter, the city demanded $5,655.16, reflecting $720.34 in statutory interest plus $1,394.82 in collection costs and attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff conveyed its property, paid $5,655.16 under protest, and filed a federal class action, alleging due process violations. The court dismissed, stating that the plaintiff failed to allege facts that plausibly supported the assertion that it paid the demand under duress; because its payment was voluntary, plaintiff was not deprived of a constitutionally-protected property interest under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the claim was more appropriate for small claims court and questioning: why would such a small amount cause the plaintiff to exert so much time and effort? The court stated that it suspected that only lawyers stood to benefit. View "Manistee Apartments, LLC v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Abraham operated B2B, a fax advertising company. Abraham has testified that she believed it was legal to send fax advertising to companies that had an established business relationship with the sender and mistakenly thought the companies on her list met that standard. B2B faxed an advertisement for Top Flite—a Michigan mortgage company—to more than 4,000 fax numbers, using that list. Recipients alleged that the fax was unsolicited and that they did not have an established business relationship with Top Flite and filed suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227. The district court denied class certification, making “no determinations” as to the requirements in Rule 23(a), but focusing on Rule 23(b)(3)'s requirement of predominance. The court expressed concern that individual class members might have consented to receiving the challenged faxes, and that determining whether they had consented would require investigation of each person or business. Top Flite then offered to allow an injunction and judgment of $1,550. Under Rule 68(b), the offers lapsed. Top Flite successfully moved to dismiss, arguing that because the court had denied class certification and plaintiffs had failed to accept offers of judgment that encompassed all of the individual relief sought, the complaints were moot. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Speculation alone regarding individualized consent was insufficient to defeat plaintiffs’ showing of predominance under Rule 23(b)(3) and the unaccepted settlement offer was a nullity. View "Bridging Communities, Inc. v. Top Flite Financial, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2010, plaintiffs, former employees of establishments that operate in “Fourth Street Live,” a Louisville entertainment district, sued, alleging violations of the Kentucky Wage and Hour Act, KRS 337.385, based on policies regarding off-the-clock work and mandatory tip-pooling. In 2012, the district court granted class certification under Rules 23(a) and 23(b). In 2013, the defendants unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, citing the Supreme Court’s 2013 "Comcast" decision. In 2014, the parties reached a financial settlement. It took almost another year to reach an agreement regarding non-monetary terms. In March 2015, the parties filed a joint status report declaring that they had reached a settlement agreement and anticipated filing formal settlement documents in April. The defendants then became aware of a February 2015 Kentucky Court of Appeals holding that KRS 337.385 could not support class-action claims. Defendants unsuccessfully moved to stay approval of the settlement. The court granted preliminary approval of the settlement. The Sixth Circuit denied an appeal as untimely because the defendants had not challenged an appealable class-certification order under Rule 23(f). Defendants filed another unsuccessful decertification motion with the district court. The court granted final approval of the settlement as “a binding contract under Kentucky law.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A post-settlement change in the law does not alter the binding nature of the parties’ agreement. View "Whitlock v. FSL Management, LLC" on Justia Law

On February 10, 2015, Meyers was given a copy of his receipt after dining at Nicolet Restaurant in de Pere, Wisconsin. He noticed that Nicolet’s receipt did not truncate the expiration date, as required by the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA), 15 U.S.C. 1681. Meyers filed a putative class action, purportedly on behalf of everyone who had been provided a non‐compliant receipt at Nicolet, seeking only statutory damages. The district court denied Meyers’ motion for class certification, holding that Meyers had satisfied FRCP 23(a)’s four prerequisites, but failed to establish that class‐wide issues would “predominate” over issues affecting only individual potential class members. Fed R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)). In a separate suit, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that sovereign immunity barred Meyers’ claim against the Oneida Tribe, the owner of the restaurant. The Seventh Circuit then held that Meyers lacked standing in his suit against the restaurant. Violation of a statute, completely divorced from any potential real‐world harm, is not sufficient to satisfy Article III’s injury‐in‐fact requirement so, the district court lacked authority to certify a class action. View "Meyers v. Nicolet Restaurant of DePere, LLC" on Justia Law

CACH, LLC filed a complaint against William Echols alleging that Echols breached his contract with a bank when he defaulted on his obligation to pay for charges incurred on a credit card and that, as current owner of the account, CACH was entitled to payment of the balance due on the credit card. Echols filed a class action counterclaim alleging that CACH violated the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the common law when it demanded payment from and filed suit against Echols and other Arkansas residents. The circuit court entered an order granting class certification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting class certification. View "CACH, LLC v. Echols" on Justia Law

Edward Snow, individually and as putative class representative on behalf of all similarly situated people, filed a complaint against SEECO, Inc. alleging that SEECO had underpaid royalties to plaintiffs, a group of landowners who had entered into natural gas leases with SEECO. Snow subsequently filed a motion for class certification. The circuit court granted Snow’s motion to present a class of Arkansas citizens who entered into lease agreements with SEECO for the production of natural gas on their property in the Fayetteville Shale. SEECO appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class. View "SEECO Inc. v. Snow" on Justia Law

In this class action case, the circuit court granted class certification to a group of landowners who entered into natural gas leases with SEECO, Inc., DeSoto Gathering Company, and Southwestern Midstream Services Company (collectively, SEECO). After the court certified the class and the class certification was pending on appeal, the class representative died. The circuit court judge entered an order finding that Stephanie DeVazier was a qualified class representative and approved her as a substitute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prior filing of a competing class action lawsuit did not preclude this case from going forward; (2) the circuit court properly certified the class; and (3) DeVazier was properly substituted as lead plaintiff. View "SEECO Inc. v. Stewmon" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were both insured by USAA Casualty Insurance Company under auto insurance policies that provided medical payments coverage. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against USAA arguing that USAA’s practice of sending medical claims to Auto Injury Solutions (AIS) for review was an improper cost containment scheme designed to deprive Montana consumers of their first-party medical pay benefits. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion to certify a proposed class. The district court issued its order certifying the class, concluding “all members of the proposed class were subject to the same claims processing procedure of outsourcing claims to AIS. USAA appealed from the certification order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion by certifying the class under Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and under Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Remanded. View "Byorth v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law