Justia Class Action Opinion Summaries

Connie Lange purchased a fifth-wheel camping trailer from GMT Auto Sales in August 2020, which included a $199 administrative fee. Lange later filed a class action petition alleging that GMT violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act by charging this fee, arguing that fifth-wheel camping trailers do not qualify as "motor vehicles," "vessels," or "vessel trailers" under the relevant statute. GMT initially moved to dismiss the case but later moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in the retail installment contract.The Circuit Court of St. Louis County overruled GMT's motion to dismiss and later granted GMT's motion to compel arbitration. The arbitrator awarded Lange $199 and $5,000 in attorney fees. Lange then filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award and reconsider the order compelling arbitration, which the circuit court denied. Lange appealed, arguing that GMT waived its right to arbitration by filing the motion to dismiss and that the arbitration provision was unenforceable.The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment, agreeing with Lange that GMT waived its right to arbitration. The Supreme Court of Missouri granted transfer and reviewed the case de novo. The court found that GMT did not waive its right to arbitration by filing the motion to dismiss, as it timely moved to compel arbitration and raised it as an affirmative defense in its responsive pleading. The court also found that the arbitration provision remained enforceable despite the assignment of the retail installment contract to a bank. Lange's argument regarding the unconscionability of the arbitration provision was deemed unpreserved for review.The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court's judgment confirming the arbitration award. View "Lange v. GMT Auto Sales, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC; MSPA Claims 1, LLC; and Series PMPI filed a lawsuit in September 2018 against Fresenius Medical Care Holdings and related entities, alleging negligence, product liability, and design defect claims related to the GranuFlo product used in hemodialysis treatments. The claims arose from a 2012 public memorandum by Fresenius that GranuFlo could lead to cardiopulmonary arrest. The plaintiffs argued that the statute of limitations was tolled by a putative class action filed in 2013 (the Berzas action) in the Eastern District of Louisiana, which was later transferred to the District of Massachusetts as part of multidistrict litigation (MDL).The District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the plaintiffs' claims as time-barred, concluding that the Berzas action ceased to be a class action by June 2014 when the named plaintiffs filed Short Form Complaints or stipulations of dismissal, which did not include class allegations. The court also noted that the Berzas plaintiffs did not pursue class certification actively, and the case was administratively closed in April 2019.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The First Circuit held that the Berzas action lost its class action status by June 2014, and any tolling under American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah ended at that time. The court reasoned that allowing indefinite tolling based on an inactive class certification request would contravene the principles of efficiency and economy in litigation. Therefore, the plaintiffs' 2018 complaint was untimely, and the district court's dismissal was upheld. View "MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

James Hulce, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, filed a putative class action suit against Zipongo Inc., doing business as Foodsmart. Hulce alleged that Foodsmart violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by making unsolicited calls and sending text messages to him, despite his number being on the national do-not-call registry. Foodsmart's communications were about free nutritional services offered through Hulce's state and Medicaid-funded healthcare plan, Chorus Community Healthcare Plans (CCHP).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted Foodsmart's motion for summary judgment. The court found that the calls and messages did not constitute "telephone solicitations" under the TCPA because they were not made for the purpose of encouraging the purchase of services. Instead, the communications were about services that were free to Hulce, with Foodsmart billing CCHP directly.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the calls and messages did not fall within the definition of "telephone solicitation" under the TCPA. The court concluded that "telephone solicitation" requires the initiation of a call or message with the purpose of persuading or urging someone to pay for a service. Since Foodsmart's communications were about free services and did not encourage Hulce to make a purchase, they did not meet this definition. The court emphasized that the purpose of the call must be to persuade someone who makes the purchasing decision to buy the services, which was not the case here. View "Hulce v Zipongo Inc." on Justia Law

In August 2023, a devastating fire in Lahaina, Maui, caused significant damage, destroying over 3,000 structures and resulting in at least 102 fatalities. Numerous lawsuits were filed by individual plaintiffs and class action plaintiffs against various defendants, including Hawaiian Electric Industries and others. Additionally, several insurance carriers filed subrogation actions to recover benefits paid to their insureds for damages caused by the fires. A global settlement agreement was reached among the plaintiffs and defendants, but the settlement required either a release of all subrogation claims by the insurance carriers or a final judgment that the insurers' exclusive remedy would be a lien against the settlement under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 663-10.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit reserved three questions for the Hawai‘i Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case and issued an opinion. The court held that the holding in Yukumoto v. Tawarahara, which limited subrogation remedies for health insurers to reimbursement from their insureds under HRS § 663-10, extends to property and casualty insurance carriers. Therefore, under HRS § 431:13-103(a)(10)(A), the lien provided for under HRS § 663-10(a) is the exclusive remedy for property and casualty insurers to recover claims paid for damages caused by a third-party tortfeasor in the context of a tort settlement.The court also held that a property and casualty insurer’s subrogation right of reimbursement is not prejudiced by its insured’s release of any tortfeasor when the settlement documents and release preserve those same rights under HRS § 663-10. Finally, the court declined to apply the made whole doctrine to the statutory lien-claim process established by HRS §§ 431:13-103(a)(10) and 663-10 under the circumstances of this mass tort case. View "In re: The Petition for the Coordination of Maui Fire Cases. S.Ct. Order" on Justia Law

Three former employees of Amazon filed a class action complaint seeking payment for straight-time and overtime wages under Connecticut’s wage laws for time spent undergoing mandatory security screenings after clocking out. The employees argued that this time should be compensable under state law. Amazon required employees to pass through security screenings when exiting the secured area of their fulfillment centers, but not upon entry. The screenings involved metal detectors and varied based on the personal belongings employees carried. Employees were not compensated for the time spent in these screenings.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment in favor of Amazon, dismissing the employees' complaint. The court relied on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, which held that time spent in mandatory security screenings is not compensable under federal law. The employees appealed the decision and moved to certify a question to the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding the applicability of Connecticut’s wage laws to their case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the question of whether Connecticut’s wage laws require compensation for time spent in mandatory security screenings is unresolved. The court decided to certify this question to the Connecticut Supreme Court for a definitive resolution. Additionally, the court asked the Connecticut Supreme Court to address whether a de minimis exception applies to such compensable time and, if so, what amount of time is considered de minimis. The Second Circuit reserved its decision and dismissed the employees' motion to certify as moot, pending the Connecticut Supreme Court's response. View "Del Rio v. Amazon.com.DECE, LLC" on Justia Law

Gina Burt filed a lawsuit against Playtika, Ltd. and Playtika Holding Corporation in Tennessee state court, seeking to recover alleged gambling losses incurred by Tennessee residents who played Playtika’s online games. Burt's claim was based on Tennessee Code Ann. § 29-19-105, which allows recovery of gambling losses. Playtika removed the case to federal court, invoking jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) and traditional diversity jurisdiction.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee remanded the case to state court. The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction because Burt’s suit was not a “class action” under CAFA, and the losses of the Tennessee players could not be aggregated to meet the amount in controversy requirement for traditional diversity jurisdiction. Playtika appealed the remand order under CAFA’s expedited removal appeal provision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s remand order. The appellate court held that Burt lacked Article III standing to proceed in federal court because she did not allege that she personally suffered any gambling loss. The court found that Burt’s claim to recover losses on behalf of other Tennessee residents did not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for standing. Additionally, the court rejected Burt’s argument that she had standing under a qui tam theory, concluding that Tennessee Code Ann. § 29-19-105 is not a qui tam statute. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to remand the case to state court. View "Burt v. Playtika, Ltd." on Justia Law

Susan Carpenter, as trustee for the H. Joe King, Jr. Revocable Trust, sold two properties in North Carolina in April 2020. Both properties were part of homeowners’ associations managed by William Douglas Management, Inc. Carpenter paid fees for statements of unpaid assessments required for the sales, which she claimed were excessive under North Carolina law. She filed a class action lawsuit against William Douglas and NextLevel Association Solutions, Inc., alleging violations of state laws, including the prohibition of transfer fee covenants, the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and the Debt Collection Act, along with claims of negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy.The case was initially filed in North Carolina state court but was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. The district court dismissed Carpenter’s complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that the fees charged were not transfer fees as defined by state law and that the companies were not deceptive or unfair in charging them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the fees charged for the statements of unpaid assessments did not qualify as transfer fees under North Carolina law. The court also found that the fees were not unfair or deceptive under the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Consequently, Carpenter’s additional claims of unjust enrichment, violation of the Debt Collection Act, negligent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy were also dismissed, as they were contingent on the success of her primary claims. View "Carpenter v. William Douglas Management Inc" on Justia Law

Elizabeth Perez, a former employee of Rose Hills Company, filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of herself and similarly situated employees, alleging violations of California wage-and-hour laws. The complaint did not specify the amount in controversy or the frequency of the alleged violations. Rose Hills removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which allows removal if the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.The United States District Court for the Central District of California remanded the case to state court, stating that Rose Hills did not meet CAFA’s $5 million amount-in-controversy requirement. The district court found that Rose Hills failed to provide evidence justifying its assumed violation rate, which was used to calculate the amount in controversy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a removing defendant under CAFA is permitted to rely on reasonable assumptions based on the plaintiff’s complaint to calculate the amount in controversy. The court found that Rose Hills’ approach, which included assumptions about the violation rate tethered to the language of the complaint, was reasonable. The district court erred by requiring Rose Hills to provide evidence supporting its assumed violation rate.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to evaluate whether Rose Hills’ violation-rate assumption was a reasonable interpretation of the complaint. The court emphasized that assumptions need not be proven with evidence if they are reasonable interpretations of the complaint’s allegations. View "Perez v. Rose Hills Company" on Justia Law

Bradley Patton was arrested in Rutherford County, Tennessee, and charged with drug and firearm offenses. He posted bail multiple times, but his bail was eventually increased to $126,000. Under local rules, because his bail exceeded $75,000, he had to prove in a hearing that the bail money was not derived from criminal activities. Patton filed a class-action lawsuit in federal court, claiming that this local rule violated his due-process and Eighth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed Patton's claims, ruling that they were moot because he had been released from pretrial custody and there was no ongoing harm. The court also found that Patton could not rely on the putative class's standing to preserve his claims and rejected his argument that the claims were capable of repetition yet evading review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Patton's claims fell within the "inherently transitory" exception to mootness for class-action claims. The court noted that pretrial detention is inherently temporary and that other class members would likely suffer the same injury. The court also found that the district court's decision to reserve the deadline for filing a motion for class certification meant that Patton should not be penalized for not filing such a motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Patton v. Fitzhugh" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, representing a putative class, filed an antitrust lawsuit against Grubhub Inc., Postmates Inc., and Uber Technologies, Inc. (collectively, "Defendants"). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and its state analogues by entering into no-price competition clauses (NPCCs) with restaurants, which prevented the restaurants from offering lower prices through other channels. The plaintiffs claimed that these NPCCs led to artificially high prices for restaurant meals. The class included customers who purchased takeout or delivery directly from restaurants subject to NPCCs, customers who dined in at such restaurants, and customers who used non-defendant platforms to purchase from these restaurants.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the defendants' motion to compel arbitration. The court held that the scope of the arbitration clauses was an issue for the court to decide and that the clauses did not apply to the plaintiffs' claims as they lacked a nexus to the defendants' Terms of Use. The court also found that the plaintiffs had not agreed to Grubhub's Terms of Use.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision in part, ruling that the question of arbitrability for the plaintiffs' claims against Grubhub is for the court to decide and that Grubhub's arbitration clause does not apply to the plaintiffs' antitrust claims. However, the court reversed the district court's decision in part, finding that Grubhub had established an agreement to arbitrate with the plaintiffs and that the threshold question for the plaintiffs' claims against Uber and Postmates is for the arbitrator to decide. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Davitashvili v. Grubhub" on Justia Law